Page 362 - American Stories, A History of the United States
P. 362

The dominant modern view is that the crisis was rooted in profound ideological differ-
                    ences over the morality and utility of slavery as an institution. Most interpreters agree that         14.1
                    the roots of the conflict lay in the fact that the South was a slave society and determined to
                    stay one, while the North was equally committed to a free-labor system. No other differ-
                    ences divided the regions in this decisive way. It is hard to imagine that secessionism would          14.2
                    have developed if the South like the North had abolished slavery after the Revolution.
                       Nevertheless, the existence or nonexistence of slavery will not explain why the cri-
                    sis came when and how it did. Why did the conflict become irreconcilable in the 1850s                  14.3
                    and not earlier or later? Why did it take the form of a political struggle over the future
                    of slavery in the territories? Answers to both questions require an understanding of
                    political developments that tensions over slavery did not directly cause.
                       By the 1850s, the established Whig and Democratic parties were in trouble, partly
                    because they no longer offered the voters clear-cut alternatives on economic issues that
                    had been the bread and butter of politics during the heyday of the second-party system.
                    This created an opening for new parties and issues. After the Know-Nothings failed
                    to make hostility to immigrants the basis for a political realignment, the Republicans
                    used the issue of slavery in the territories to build the first successful sectional party in
                    American history. They called for “free soil,” not freedom for blacks because abolition-
                    ism conflicted with the northern majority’s commitment to white supremacy and its
                    respect for the original constitutional compromise that established a hands-off policy
                    toward slavery in the South. For Southerners, the Republican party now became the
                    main issue, and they fought it from within the Democratic party.
                       If politicians seeking new ways to mobilize an apathetic electorate are seen as the
                    main instigators of sectional crisis, we still have to ask why certain appeals were more
                    effective than others. Why did the slavery extension issue arouse such strong feelings
                    in the two sections during the 1850s? The same issue had arisen earlier and had proved
                    adjustable, even in 1820 when the second-party system—with its vested interest in
                    compromise—had not yet emerged. If the expansion of slavery had been as vital and
                    emotional a question in 1820 as it was in the 1850s, the moribund Federalist party
                    presumably would have revived in the form of a northern sectional party adamantly
                    opposed to admitting slave states to the Union.
                       Ultimately, therefore, we must recognize that the crisis of the 1850s had both a
                    deep social and cultural dimension and a purely political one. Beliefs and values had
                    diverged significantly in the North and the South between the 1820s and the 1850s.
                    Both sections continued to profess allegiance to the traditional “republican” ideals of
                    individual liberty and independence, and both were influenced by evangelical reli-
                    gion. But differences in the economic and social development of each region trans-
                    formed a common culture into two conflicting cultures. In the North, a rising middle
                    class adapted to the new market economy with the help of an evangelical Christianity
                    that sanctioned self-discipline and social reform (see Chapter 12). The South, on the
                    other hand, embraced slavery as a foundation for white liberty and independence. Its
                    evangelicalism encouraged personal piety but not social reform and gave only limited
                    attention to building the kind of personal character that made for commercial success.
                    The notion that white liberty and equality depended on resisting social and economic
                    change and—to get to the heart of the matter—continuing to have enslaved blacks to
                    do menial labor became more entrenched.
                       When politicians appealed to sectionalism during the 1850s, therefore, they could
                    evoke conflicting views of what constituted the good society. The South—with its alleg-
                    edly idle masters, degraded unfree workers, and shiftless poor whites—seemed to most
                    Northerners to be in flagrant violation of the Protestant work ethic and the ideal of open
                    competition in “the race of life.” From the dominant southern point of view, the North
                    was a land of hypocritical money-grubbers who denied the obvious fact that the virtue,
                    independence, and liberty of free citizens were possible only when dependent laboring
                    classes—especially racially inferior ones—were kept under the kind of rigid control that
                    only slavery could provide. Once these contrary views of the world had become the main
                    themes of political discourse, sectional compromise was no longer possible.
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