Page 18 - CCFA Journal - Sixth Issue
P. 18

宏观经济 MacroEcon                                   加中金融

    Taking the above factors into consideration, it is very difficult for the GDP growth rate to exceed 5% this year. The easing stimulus
    policy will inevitably increase, but it also faces multiple restrictions, the policy space is far less than before, and the potential growth
    rate of the Chinese economy is also declining. It is already very difficult to repeat the 2009 and 2016 practice of driving the economy
    at all costs, and the sequelae may be very high. Based on the year-on-year GDP growth rate of 4.9% in the third quarter of 2021, the
    contribution of exports is about 2.4 percentage points. If the contribution of exports to growth in 2022 is zero, if other factors remain
    unchanged, the GDP growth rate will drop below 3%.
    In terms of consumer demand, the actual growth of retail sales in the third quarter of 2021 was 3.2%. Due to the increase in the
    frequency of outbreaks of the new crown epidemic, even if the government significantly increases financial subsidies to residents and
    enterprises affected by the epidemic, it may be difficult for the consumption growth rate to return to above 3% in the short term, let
    alone above 5%, consumption is very likely It is a drag item rather than a pull item for GDP growth in 2022.

    In terms of real estate investment, excluding the price factor, the third quarter of 2021 is already zero growth. The first half of 2022
    is almost certain to be negative, and a rebound in the second half is needed to avoid a sharp decline.

    In  terms  of  infrastructure,  because  local  governments  have  traditionally  undertaken  about  90%  of  the  country’s  infrastructure
    investment, it is unrealistic to expect a sharp rebound in infrastructure investment in the context of the decline in local government
    land sales revenue and the central government’s strict control of local hidden liabilities. The contribution of infrastructure investment
    to GDP is about 10%, and the pulling effect of infrastructure on GDP is also significantly smaller than that of real estate. We cannot
    expect that infrastructure investment can make a sharp rebound in GDP. Manufacturing investment was a bright spot in 2021, but
    headwinds could rise significantly in 2022. The ongoing epidemic, slowing export growth and more rational new energy strategies
    may have a certain impact on manufacturing investment.

    不可低估的不确定性因素

    2022 年面临的宏观经济环境有两个很大的不确定性,这种背景下不适合制定 5%这个确实较高的增长底线。如果一定要确
    保 5%,就必须大幅提升宽松刺激力度,付出的代价可能过大,对今后几年经济结构的调整、增长质量的提升和金融风险
    的防范非常不利。

         首先就是全球新冠疫情。目前新冠的演变趋势是新变种出现的时间较为随机、传播力强、毒性衰减,致死率显著
           降低。这种演变趋势一方面扰动全球经济复苏进程,对中国造成外需的波动;另一方面对中国动态清零政策尤其
           构成了巨大的挑战。如前所述,疫情持续时间越长,病毒传播力越高,动态清零的成本越高。面对如此高的疫情
           不确定性,设置过高的增长底线就会面临很大的风险。
         第二个不确定性是美国等发达国家在通胀高企背景下被迫加速退出刺激政策。退出节奏本身具有不确定性,现在
           市场普遍预期美联储会在三月底之前结束本轮数量宽松,2022 年加息三次,但最近几天已有不少人预测美联储会
           很快开启缩表并加息四次。美联储调整其 QE 政策和加息必然会给全球经济和金融市场带来较大的不确定性,最后
           影响如何,传导机制怎样,现在是无法准确预判的。面对如此复杂的宏观环境,也不太适宜设置较高的增长底线,
           而应该采用弹性更大的如“5%左右”这样的目标。
         最后还是要强调“5%左右”本身也是一个很高的目标,需要政府果断实施一批依托市场,既能拉动合理需求,又
           能增加有效供给的宽松刺激政策。

     Uncertainty factors that cannot be underestimated

    There are two big uncertainties in the macroeconomic environment faced in 2022. In this context, it is not suitable to formulate a
    really high growth bottom line of 5%. If we must ensure 5%, we must greatly increase the easing stimulus. The price to be paid may
    be too high, which is very unfavorable for the adjustment of the economic structure, the improvement of the quality of growth and
    the prevention of financial risks in the next few years.

         The first is the global COVID-19 pandemic. The current evolution trend of the new crown is that the time of emergence of
           new  variants  is  relatively  random,  the  transmission  power  is  strong,  the  toxicity  is  attenuated,  and  the  fatality  rate  is
           significantly reduced. On the one hand, this evolutionary trend disturbs the process of global economic recovery and causes
           fluctuations in China’s external demand; on the other hand, it poses a huge challenge to China’s dynamic clearing policy. As
           mentioned above, the longer the epidemic lasts, the higher the virus spread, and the higher the cost of dynamic clearing. In
           the face of such high epidemic uncertainty, setting too high a growth bottom line will face great risks.
         The second uncertainty is that developed countries such as the United States are forced to accelerate the withdrawal of
           stimulus policies against the backdrop of high inflation. The rhythm of the exit itself is uncertain. Now the market generally
           expects the Fed to end this round of quantitative easing before the end of March and raise interest rates three times in 2022.
           However, in recent days, many people have predicted that the Fed will soon start to shrink its balance sheet and raise interest
           rates. four times. The Fed adjusting its QE policy and raising interest rates will inevitably bring greater uncertainty to the
           global economy and financial markets. It is impossible to accurately predict the final impact and transmission mechanism. In
           the face of such a complex macro environment, it is not suitable to set a higher growth bottom line, but a more flexible target
           such as “about 5%” should be adopted.
         Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that “about 5%” itself is  also a high goal, and the government needs to resolutely
           implement a series of loose stimulus policies that rely on the market and can not only stimulate reasonable demand, but also
           increase effective supply.


                                           CCFA JOURNAL OF FINANCE   February 2022
     Page 18     第18页
   13   14   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   23