Page 13 - CCFA Journal - Sixth Issue

加中金融 宏观经济 MacroEcon

在具体讨论三个压力之前，有必要回顾一下近期经济形势。2021 年三季度 GDP 同比增长 4.9%，和疫情前 2019 年相比的两
年同比均速也是 4.9%，已经慢于 5%。若分析增长贡献，三季度 GDP 增长的一半来自于出口，固定资产投资的实际增速为
负，可能在-10%左右，而代表消费的零售实际增速也只有 3.2%。若以国际标准来看环比增速（折算成年率），则 GDP 增
速已经由二季度的 4.9%暴跌至三季度的 0.8%。根据已公布的数据，四季度消费、投资和出口这三驾马车全线下滑，零售
实际增长在 11 月只有 0.5%，四季度 GDP 同比增速大概率会降至 4%以下，甚至到 3%左右。在此背景下，要将 2022 年增长
目标设定在“5%以上”或“5.5%左右”，需要经济增速在年初就出现大幅反弹，但这样的可能性已经很小。

Before diving deeper, it is worth reviewing the recent economic situation. GDP in China grew by about 4.9% year-on-year in the third
quarter of 2021, which is comparable with the 2-year average growth rate of 4.9% in 2019 before the pandemic. Around half of the
GDP growth in the third quarter came from exports, with retail sales growth contributing 3.2% and capex growth shrinking by 10%.
According to published data, the combination of consumption, investment and exports declined across the board in the fourth quarter
with the year-on-year GDP growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2021 likely dropping below 4%, or even to 3%. Therefore, setting a
growth target above 5% is very challenging.

三大下行压力

第一个压力来自房地产业，其下行对经济的影响可从以下几个角度来分析。

 一是与建房相关的固定资产投资，约占 GDP 的 17%，滞后于新开工约半年左右。过去几个月房企新开工面积已经同
比下降 20%以上，这必然会影响接下来的建房投资。
 二是对财政的滞后影响。开发商支付给地方政府的购地款在 2020 年高达 8.4 万亿元人民币，是中国 GDP 的 8.4%，
约为公共财政收入的 46%，这笔收入是地方政府在基建投资的重要资金来源。因为从政府卖地到收款之间有一定的
时滞，2021 年 11 月政府卖地收入已经同比下降 10%，根据过去几个月的政府卖地情况，未来半年政府卖地现金收
入将大幅下降 30%乃至 40%以上。另外，与房地产相关的税收收入约占全国公共财政收入的 24%，这块收入还将大
幅下降。
 三是房企的债务违约对上下游企业和金融市场的冲击。我们估计房企的总体债务规模在 30 万亿以上，民营房企因
为融资问题已经有一部分关联企业尤其是建筑企业陷入财务困境。
 四是中国城市居民的财富紧紧绑定在房地产之上，城市家庭财富中房产占比高达 78%，居民负债较高，房价下行不
仅会带来负面的财富效应从而削弱居民消费，也会增加金融系统的信贷风险。

Three Major Economic Pressures

The first pressure comes from the real estate industry, and its economic impact can be analyzed from the following angles.

 First, capex spending related to housing construction, which accounts for about 17% of GDP, lagged behind new construction
by about half a year. In the past few months, the number of new housing projects have dropped by more than 20% year-on-
year, which will inevitably affect subsequent investments in the housing market.
 The second pressure is its delayed impact on finance. Developers are paying as high as 8.4 trillion yuan to local governments
for land in 2020, which is 8.4% of China’s GDP and about 46% of public revenue, an important source of funds for
infrastructure investments. The lag between making a sale and receiving a payment caused the government’s land sale
revenue to decline by 10% in November 2021, and could potentially decline by 30% to 40% in the next 6 months. This may
also lead to a decline in the tax revenue, 24% of which comes from real estate.
 The third pressure is the impact of potential default of real estate enterprises in the financial market. We estimate that the
overall debt of real estate companies is more than 30 trillion yuan. Affiliated companies of private real estate firms, especially
in the construction sector, have already fallen into financial difficulties.
 Finally, the wealth of Chinese urban residents is closely tied to real estate. Real estate accounts for 78% of the urban
household wealth, and residents are highly leveraged. The decline in housing prices will weakening discretionary consumption
and increase credit risk in the financial system.

CCFA JOURNAL OF FINANCE February 2022
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