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19 Volume 73 Number 1
15 February 2021
by senior RAN officers as the best way to investi- collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of
gate the incident, a series of incidents and acci- Robertson and two other bridge officers, as they
dents during the 1950s and early 1960s had left did not alert Voyager to the danger she was in
the general public with a mistrust of navy-run in- and appeared to not take measures to prevent
vestigations, and Prime Minister Robert Menzies Melbourne from colliding. Robertson was marked
made it clear that an inquiry supervised by a fed- for transfer to HMAS Watson, a training base in
eral judge would be the only acceptable route: Sydney, and the admirals of the RAN decided to
anything else would be seen as a cover up. Regu- prevent Robertson from serving on Melbourne or
lations for such an externally supervised inquiry any other seagoing vessel in the future. Robertson
were supposed to have been drafted following an submitted his resignation from the Navy on 10
explosion aboard HMAS Tarakan in 1950, but were September 1964, two days after receiving official
never enacted, and Menzies' only option was to notice of his new posting. The media considered
call for a Royal Commission. The Commission, to that Robertson had been made a scapegoat for
be headed by Sir John Spicer, was announced by the incident.
Menzies on 13 February 1964. This commission Second Royal Commission
was directed primarily to investigate the immedi-
ate causes of the collision, and the circumstances Over the next few years there was increasing
which led up to it. Secondary considerations in- pressure from the public, the media, and politi-
cluded the suitability of both ships for the exer- cians of the Government and Opposition over the
cise, and the rescue and treatment of survivors. handling of the first Royal Commission, as well as
These in- claims made
structions by Lieuten-
were pre- ant Com-
pared with- mander Pe-
out the con- ter Cabban,
sultation of the former
the RAN. The executive
number of officer of
competing Voyager,
arguments that Captain
caused the Stevens fre-
progress of quently
the investi- drank to ex-
gation to be cess and
slow, and it was unfit for
was not until command.
25 June that On 18 May
the inquiry 1967, Prime
was ended, Minister Har-
and the re- old Holt an-
port begun. HMAS Voyager nounced a
The Spicer https://www.seniorsnews.com.au/news/hmas-voyager-disaster- second Roy-
Report was transmitter-could-be-culprit/3331104/ al Commis-
released sion into the
publicly on 26 August 1964. Melbourne-Voyager collision, with Sir Stanley Bur-
bury, The Hon. Mr Justice Kenneth Asprey, and
The report was considered to be of poor quality, The Hon. Mr Justice George Lucas as presiding
as it had a disjointed narrative and repeatedly Commissioners investigating the claims made by
failed to cite the relevant evidence. In it, Spicer Cabban. It was the only time in Australian history
concluded that the collision was primarily the fault that two Royal Commissions have been held on
of Voyager's bridge crew, in that they neglected to the same incident, although it was emphasised
maintain an effective lookout and lost awareness that the second enquiry was to focus on Cabban's
of the carrier's location, although he did not blame allegations, not the accident itself. The commis-
individual officers. When reporting on the contri- sion opened on 13 June 1967, and hearings com-
bution of Melbourne and those aboard her to the
menced on 18 July.

http://www.noabc.com/