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20 Volume 73 Number 1
15 February 2021
A post-mortem conducted on Stevens' body mine, because all but one sailor from the bridge
showed a blood alcohol level of 0.025%, though of Voyager were killed. In the immediate after-
the significance of this figure was challenged by math of the collision, there were thought to be
expert witnesses. It was argued that Stevens was five possible causes: communications between
unfit for command on the evening of the incident the two vessels did not reflect the ships' inten-
due to illness, drunkenness, or a combination of tions,
the two, and that the description of the collision
in Spicer's report and the 1. Those aboard Voyager
conclusions drawn from it had an incorrect idea of
were inconsistent with where they were in rela-
events. The hearings last- tion to Melbourne,
ed 85 days, and the Bur- 2. The sea room required
bury Report was released for the destroyer to ma-
publicly on 25 February noeuvre was miscalculat-
1968. It found that Ste- ed,
vens was medically unfit 3. The level of training
for command, and that aboard one or both ships
some of the findings of
the first Royal Commission was deficient, or
were therefore based on 4. An equipment failure
incorrect assumptions. occurred aboard one or
Explicitly it found, 'beyond both ships.
doubt that any suggestion The equipment failure, in-
that his faculties or judge- adequate training, and
ment were in any way im- miscalculated sea room
paired by alcohol at the theories were disproven by
time of the collision is the two Royal Commis-
positively excluded'. Rob- sions, leaving the sugges-
ertson and the other offic- tion that either a commu-
ers of Melbourne were ab- nication error aboard one
solved of blame for the of the ships caused Voyag-
incident. er to manoeuvre in an un-
Additional Evidence desired manner, or the
officers aboard Voyager
On condition of anonymi- were incorrectly aware of
ty, a doctor informed the their vessel's position in
first Royal Commission
that he had been confi- relation to the much larger
dentially prescribing am- https://www.allenandunwin.com/browse/ aircraft carrier.
phetamine sulphate to books/general-books/history/The-Cruel- Naval historian and ex-RAN
Captain Stevens prior to Legacy-Tom-Frame-9781741144215 officer Tom Frame, who
the collision. This was a studied the collision for his
legal drug at the time and was carried in RAN doctoral thesis, believes that the main cause of
ships' medical lockers. Navy Minister Don Chipp the collision was an error in communications:
has suggested this as an explanation for the con- specifically, that the instruction to turn to 020°
tradictory impressions created in the minds of then assume the plane guard station was garbled
witnesses who reported on Captain Stevens' ap- on receipt by Voyager.] The signal was "Foxtrot
parent state of health and demeanour prior to the Corpen 020 22", meaning that Melbourne was
collision. This evidence was not made public until about to commence flying operations on a head-
after both enquiries were completed. ing of 020°, at a speed of 22 knots (41 km/h; 25
mph), and that Voyager was to assume the plane
Analysis
guard station. While the first Royal Commission
While the inattentiveness of the lookouts and considered the likelihood that the code phrase
bridge crew were a contributing factor to the col- "foxtrot corpen" was reversed to become "corpen
lision, the exact cause has been difficult to deter- foxtrot" (an order to turn onto the given course),

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