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22 United States The Economist April 25th 2020

Lexington The limits of energy independence

The Trump administration is ill-equipped for a Middle East crisis that looks increasingly likely

predecessors. This could be about to change, with a pair of historic
crises—an unprecedented calamity on oil markets and a global
pandemic—threatening American oil production, Middle Eastern
stability and in turn the administration’s diplomatic grip.
The coming decimation of America’s shale-oil firms could
eventually lead to renewed dependence on Saudi oil. American
production is predicted to fall to 10m barrels a day, around half the
country’s pre-pandemic consumption. In the meantime near-uni-
versal anti-Saudi feeling in Washington is putting the bilateral re-
lationship under great strain. Last month Republican senators in
oil-producing states, who had been almost the Saudis’ last defend-
ers on the Hill, turned furiously against the kingdom. Kevin
Cramer of North Dakota and Dan Sullivan of Alaska introduced leg-
islation to withdraw American troops and missile-defence sys-
tems if it did not cut its oil production. Reports this week that a
fleet of laden Saudi tankers was en route to oil-glutted America
caused fresh fury. Mr Trump suggested he might close the coun-
try’s ports to it. The notion of American-Saudi co-operation to re-
order the Middle East has rarely looked more fanciful.
Meanwhile a region whose stability America has considered
supremely important for seven decades is experiencing two black
swans in one swoop. Oil-poor countries such as Egypt, Jordan and
ven when American policy in the Middle East has been about Bahrain are facing a health-care crisis which their oil-rich neigh-
Emore than oil, it has been about oil. That has sometimes been bours would in normal times send them cash to stave off. Yet the
jarringly obvious, as when Dwight Eisenhower justified his deci- Saudis, in need of an oil price of around $80 a barrel to balance
sion to send troops to the region in 1958 on the basis that it was the their budget, are focused on fiscal problems at home. A normal
“birthplace of three great religions”, as well as having “two-thirds American administration might be expected to rally multilateral
of the presently known oil deposits”. At other times the oiliness of agencies to make up the shortfall for the poorer Arab states. Mr
America’s policy has been more subtle, or partial. George W. Bush Trump is instead trying to defund the World Health Organisation.
invaded Iraq in 2003 for several reasons: to secure its weapons of This represents a threat of instability that Iran will try to ex-
mass destruction, to spread democracy, and, his would-be succes- ploit. Though badly afflicted by the coronavirus, it shows no sign
sor John McCain acknowledged, to guarantee America’s oil supply. of reducing its operations in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere.
Donald Trump’s commitment to reducing America’s involve- Meanwhile Israel could soon start annexing the West Bank. All in
ment in the Middle East also relates to the black stuff. It is justified all, the chances of a regional blowout, which America will either be
in part by the shale-oil revolution that has made America the drawn into or castigated for neglecting, are rising again.
world’s biggest producer, lessening its dependence on the region. A couple of lessons can already be drawn from this troubling
The administration’s effort to promote Saudi Arabia as a regional prospect. One is that America’s reduced dependence on the Middle
proxy, to help effect its withdrawal, is also somehow oleaginous. East is not making its regional policymaking any easier. Quite the
The president’s Middle East consigliere, Jared Kushner, sees the contrary: where there was once bipartisan backing for bold inter-
country’s crown prince, Mohammad bin Salman, as an oil-impor- ventions, finding support for modest commitments would now be
tant ally against Iran and potential ally for Israel. Mr Trump views hard even if Mr Trump had not politicised every aspect of his for-
the Saudis as oil-rich buyers of American arms and property. eign policy. Instead of bragging of “American energy dominance”, a
Both oil-related struts of his Middle East policy looked shaky phrase that now looks especially foolish, a wiser administration
even before the meltdown in oil markets that began last month. A would have sought to build support for a more nuanced Middle
spike in the oil price in September, after a drone strike on a Saudi East policy: more modest than Mr Bush’s, more resolute than Mr
installation, was a reminder that America is still at the mercy of the Obama’s, and consistent in its aims.
global oil market and therefore Middle Eastern instability. The
Saudis have proved to be an embarrassing proxy. They have addi- Oleaginous and always with us
tionally failed to make good on almost any of the arms deals the Another lesson is that a lighter American footprint in the region
president trumpeted. And the more he has pushed the bilateral re- requires broad-based alliances, not headstrong proxies. The first
lationship, the more politically toxic it has become. are a means to rise above the region’s interminable petty rivalries,
There are many such contradictions in the administration’s the second almost a guarantee of being dragged into them. Ameri-
Middle East plans. They are at once ambitious—Mr Trump pledged ca has a rich legacy of the right sort of partnership, including the
to end regional terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the trans-Atlantic ones behind Mr Obama’s nuclear deal and a patch-
Iranian threat—and undermined by his serial reluctance to take work of regional allies. But Mr Trump has squandered them.
strong or consistent action. His statements on Iran have been so The trans-Atlantic pact has foundered on his attack on the nuc-
contradictory it is unclear what his policy is there: regime change lear deal. And when asked on American television who was help-
or a footling renegotiation of Barack Obama’s nuclear deal. Yet in ing his country through the pandemic, King Abdullah of Jordan, a
the absence of a major regional crisis, the sum of the administra- longtime ally, gave a startling answer. He was grateful, he said, to
tion’s faltering efforts has looked no worse than that of its recent the United Arab Emirates and the Chinese entrepreneur Jack Ma.7