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Sefer Chafetz Chayim                                  7
                                    Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara

                                            Kelal Dalet - Halachah 5

               behavior. Similarly, he (the Yad HaKetanah) expresses this same idea at
               the end of the 25th halacha. But this is perplexing, because if this was so
               then the implication of his (the Yad HaKetana’s) words is that this person
               most certainly did not repent his ways, because if this was not so (and he
              only may have repented), based on what he (the Yad HeKetanah) said it
               would be forbidden to hate him. Thus, since this person certainly did not
               repent, he is no longer in the category of “your fellow Jew” and it is both
               permitted and a mitzvah to publicly disclose his evil behavior. This concept
               is contained within the second law (Section #220) written by Rabbeinu
               Yonah himself afterwards (quoted as follows) “and this (evil) person was
               not careful to avoid committing a sin that was commonly known to all of
              society to be sinful;” when saying “and this person” Rabbeinu Yonah’s
              intent was “or this person” is not careful, etc. (meaning he repudiated the
              laws of the Torah, or he was not careful (uncaring) and repeated his sin, as
               was understood by the Yad HaKetana (in his writings).

               So why did Rabbeinu Yonah write that the disclosure should specifically
               be made to the judicial authorities of the city?26 And also, why did he
               write in section #220 “and he may not publicly embarrass him…your
               fellow Jew.”? (Meaning, if he repeatedly commits a sin that is known
               throughout Jewish society to be a sin, why is he still referred to as “your
               brother?” Therefore Rabbeinu Yonah must not be referring to the behavior
               of a Rasha.)

               Thus we are forced to say there is a practical difference between simply
               hating this person (passively) and proactively doing some harm to him-
               meaning to publicize his evil behavior or to humiliate him in which case
               we are stringent (in our response and we are not proactive) since he may
               have repented his evil behavior.

               Thus, having gotten to this point, we may presume to say that it is permitted
               to hate even an average person (who sinned), that regarding this the Torah
               also states (Shemot 23:5) “[the donkey of] someone you hate,” and it would
               be a great dauchak to say the gemara there (Pesachim 113b) “he (Zeegood)
               witnessed him (Tuvia) committing an immoral act” was specifically
               referring to someone whose routine lifestyle was evil. However, regarding
               the issue of disclosing his (evil) behavior or embarrassing him, we take the
               stringent side of the law (and we don’t permit this disclosure) since he may
               have repented. One should analyze this very carefully.

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