Page 464 - Q24 -
P. 464

√«¡º≈ß“π∑“ß«‘™“°“√¢Õß»“ μ√“®“√¬å∏“π‘π∑√å °√—¬«‘‡™’¬√            445




                 ¢÷Èπ„™â∫—ߧ—∫‡∑à“π—Èπ ·≈–∑ƒ…Æ’Õ”‡¿Õ°“√≥å (THE OBJECTIVE THEORY) ∑’ˇÀÁπ«à“

                 ºŸâæ‘æ“°…“ “¡“√∂μ’§«“¡°ÆÀ¡“¬„Àâ·ª√‡ª≈’ˬπ‰ªμ“¡æƒμ‘°“√≥å∑’ˇ°‘¥¢÷Èπ„π¢≥–∑’Ë
                          (Ò¯)
                 μ’§«“¡‰¥â

                        „π‡√◊ËÕßπ’È ≈Õ√奇¥ππ‘Ëß (LORD DENNING) „π¢≥–‡ªìπÕ∏‘∫¥’ºŸâæ‘æ“°…“

                 »“≈Õÿ∑∏√≥å¢ÕßÕ—ß°ƒ…‰¥â«‘π‘®©—¬‰«â„𧥒 Nothman v. London Borough of Barnat
                 [1978] 1 All E.R. 1243.  CA. at page 1246 «à“:

                        çªí®®ÿ∫—π „π∑ÿ°°√≥’»“≈®–μâÕßμ’§«“¡°ÆÀ¡“¬‡æ◊ËÕ∑’Ë®– π—∫ πÿπ‡®μπ“√¡≥å

                 ‚¥¬∑—Ë«‰ª∑’Ë·ΩßÕ¬Ÿà„π∫∑∫—≠≠—μ‘¢Õß°ÆÀ¡“¬ (THE GENERAL LEGISLATIVE

                 PURPOSE UNDERLYING THE PROVISION)... À“°°“√μ’§«“¡°ÆÀ¡“¬Õ¬à“ß

                 ‡§√àߧ√—¥ (μ“¡μ—«Õ—°…√) ·≈â«®–‡°‘¥º≈ª√–À≈“¥ À√◊Õ‡°‘¥§«“¡‰¡à¬ÿμ‘∏√√¡ »“≈ “¡“√∂
                 ·≈– ¡§«√„™â¥ÿ≈æ‘𑮇¬’¬«¬“‡√◊ËÕßπ’È‚¥¬‡ª≈’ˬπ∂âÕ¬§”∑’˪√“°Ø„πμ—«°ÆÀ¡“¬ „π°√≥’
                                                                                         (Ò˘)
                 ®”‡ªì𠉪„π∑“ß∑’Ë√—∞ ¿“æ÷ß°√–∑” ∂â“√—∞ ¿“μ√–Àπ—°„π ∂“π°“√≥å∑’ˇªìπ®√‘ßé

                        °≈à“«Õ’°π—¬Àπ÷Ëß«à“ »“≈μâÕßÕà“π„®¢Õß√—∞ ¿“«à“∂â“√—∞ ¿“‡ªìπ»“≈·≈–Õ¬Ÿà„π

                 ‡Àμÿ°“√≥åπ—Èπ®√‘ßÊ ·≈â«√—∞ ¿“®–μ—¥ ‘π„®Õ¬à“߉√ ·≈–∂◊Õμ“¡π—ÈπÕ¬à“߉√°Á¥’ ‡¡◊ËÕ§¥’

                 ¢÷Èπ Ÿà»“≈ ¿“¢ÿππ“ß ([1979] 1 All E.R. 142) §«“¡‡ÀÁπ¢Õß≈Õ√奇¥ππ‘Ëß∂Ÿ°«‘æ“°…å
                 «‘®“√≥凪ìπÕ—π¡“°«à“‡ªìπ°“√μ’¢≈ÿ¡ (SWEEPING COMMENTS) ·≈–¬—߉¡à‡ªìπ

                 ∑’ˬա√—∫„π¢≥–π—Èπ

                        ªí®®ÿ∫—π ·¡â®–¡’°“√‡ª≈’ˬπ·ª≈ß„πÀ≈—°°“√μ’§«“¡°ÆÀ¡“¬Õ—ß°ƒ…À≈“¬‡√◊ËÕß

                 ·μ໓≈Õ—ß°ƒ…°Á¬—ߧ߬÷¥∂◊Õ‡Õ“‡®μπ“√¡≥å¢ÕßΩÉ“¬π‘μ‘∫—≠≠—μ‘„π¢≥–∑’Ëμ√“°ÆÀ¡“¬¢÷Èπ



                 (Ò¯)
                    ‚ª√¥¥Ÿ ¥√. ª√–°Õ∫ Àÿμ– ‘ßÀå, °“√μ’§«“¡°ÆÀ¡“¬≈“¬≈—°…≥åÕ—°…√‡∑’¬∫‡§’¬ß°—∫À≈—°°ÆÀ¡“¬
                    ‡¬Õ√¡—π, ∫∑∫—≥±‘μ¬å  ‡≈à¡ ÒÒ μÕπ∑’Ë ˜ (惻®‘°“¬π ÚÙ¯Ú) Àπâ“ ÒÚ˜.
                 (Ò˘)
                    çIn all cases now in the interpretation of statutes we adopt such a construction
                    as willé promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision...Whenever
                    the strict interpretation of a statute gives rise to an absurd and unjust situation,
                    the judge can and should use their good sense to remedy it- by reading words
                    in, if necessary- so as to do what Parliament would have done hadthey had the

                    situation in mids.é : Terence Ingman. Ibid. pp. 173-174
   459   460   461   462   463   464   465   466   467   468   469