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c10competitive markets applications.qxd  7/15/10  4:58 PM  Page 404







                  404                   CHAPTER 10   COMPETITIVE MARKETS: APPLICATIONS

                  APPLICA TION  10.3
                  Scalping Super Bowl Tickets                      incur transactions costs in searching out supplies of
                                                                   tickets and locating buyers.
                  on the Internet
                                                                       In recent years the Internet has lowered both
                                                                   types of transactions costs considerably. Buyers and
                  When the National Football League (NFL) sells tickets  sellers can conduct business from the comfort of
                  to the Super Bowl, it establishes face values (the  home or the office. With a website, scalpers can
                  prices printed on the tickets) that are far below the  widely advertise tickets at a very low cost and with
                  market prices. The NFL understands that there will be  less risk of being caught than would be the case if
                  a large excess demand for tickets sold at face value. It  the transactions took place in the shadow of the
                  therefore accepts requests for tickets a year in ad-  stadium.
                  vance of the event and then chooses the recipients of  If resale involves low transactions costs, total sur-
                  the tickets in a random drawing.                 plus will be close to the maximum possible, as assumed
                      In the month before Super Bowl XLIII in Tampa,  in Case 1 of Figure 10.7 in the discussion of price ceil-
                  Florida, in 2009, tickets with a face value of $800 were  ings. Part of the surplus may go to middlemen
                  offered for sale on several Internet sites at prices  (scalpers and brokers) instead of the final holders of
                  ranging from $2,350 to $3,750. In other Super Bowls,  the tickets, but the net benefits do not disappear
                  markups have been even higher, with market prices as  from the economy.
                  much as 10 times the face value.                     Of course, scalping typically involves a certain
                      The winners of the random drawing are indeed  amount of risk, including the possibility that the tick-
                  lucky. They can use the tickets themselves or resell the  ets are not as desirable as advertised or perhaps are
                  tickets at a handsome profit. The existence of an easily  not valid at all. Those supporting laws against scalp-
                  accessible, active resale market helps move the tickets  ing often cite examples of fraud. If the original sell-
                  ultimately into the hands of people who most highly  ers of tickets or governing authorities are willing to
                  value the opportunity to see the game in person.  impose very strict conditions, it may be possible to re-
                      Two types of transactions costs affect the possibil-  duce resale greatly. For example, the seller could put
                  ity of resale. First, in some states resale (“scalping”) is  the buyer’s picture on the ticket (as is often done with
                  illegal. A law prohibiting resale is likely to be more ef-  monthly passes on urban transport systems) or write
                  fective when the penalty for a violation is high and  the buyer’s name on the ticket and require the buyer
                  when the probability of being caught reselling is  to produce a picture I.D. when she uses the ticket (as
                  high. Even though resale is illegal in many areas, it  airlines often do). However, these measures add signif-
                  may nevertheless be common where penalties are low  icant costs to businesses and to law enforcement ef-
                  or there is little risk of being caught. Second, resellers  forts and are often difficult to implement.


                                           surplus with rent control. The net economic benefit   consumer surplus
                                           producer surplus   areas A   B   C   G. The deadweight loss   net eco-
                                           nomic benefit with no rent control   net economic benefit with rent control
                                           (areas A   B   C   E   F   G)   (areas A   B   C   G)   areas E   F. The
                                           deadweight loss arises because rent control has reduced the available housing
                                           supply by 30,000 units, so the consumer surplus represented by area E and the
                                           producer surplus represented by area F have been lost to society.
                                         • Case 2 (minimum consumer surplus). Consumers with the lowest willingness to pay
                                           rent all the available housing units (i.e., consumers between points T and X on the
                                                        6
                                           demand curve, which means that consumers between points Y and T on the de-
                                           mand curve will be unable to find housing, despite their willingness to pay more

                                        6 We do not consider consumers to the right of point X on the demand curve because they would not be
                                        willing to rent housing at $1,000 even if they could find it.
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