Page 14 - CCFA Journal - Fourth Issue
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Markets 市场论坛                                     加中金融



    问答环节


    在 Q&A 问答环节,针对观众提出的问题“信用恶化会如何影响金融机构在银行间交易中的信用评级”,阿尔特曼博士表示,除非面对
    的是绝对无法否认的信用恶化,一般评级机构并不愿意下调评级,尤其是从 BBB 下调到垃圾债的等级;这也不是企业或投资者希望看
    到的。正是因为这种普遍对评级下行的抵触心理,全球金融市场将面临高风险债务融资机会的匮乏。阿尔特曼博士认为,垃圾债不一
    定是坏事,因为研究表明世界上大部分国家都是高风险评级,平均评级在 B+而非 BBB;所在企业的融资计划遭受搁浅和困阻,唯一
    的融资渠道只能是银行,然而银行对这类公司持有谨慎的评估态度(除非是国有银行受政策导向为他们提供特定支持)。所以市场需
    要更多样的渠道为高风险的信用主体和资产提供流动性。在阿尔特曼博士看来,评级机构的影响力需要其他力量予以平衡;某些国家
    实行的方式具备借鉴价值,例如意大利的迷你债券(mini-bond)市场,这是一个专门供中小型企业向公众发行债券的市场,发行规模
    大概在 200 万至 3000 万欧元。

    “随着中美紧张局势的反复升级和欧洲对中国实施的制裁,这些因素将如何影响全球经济?“王炜博士指出中美关系在疫情爆发之前就
    已经开始紧张,只是疫情更加凸显了全球供应链的利益冲突,随着疫情得到控制,中美之间的博弈会不断反复。但是回归到经济学的
    基本原理,每个国家都有自己的相对优势及供应链角色,随着时间推移,贸易是必然发生的,所以最终中美应能达成双方都能从中收
    益的贸易协定。霍奇基斯博士认为,全球供应链的调整必然会导致生产成本的增加,促发供应链上游企业和依赖于他们的美国企业发
    生违约和重组,美国究竟在多大的程度上可以承受成本增加带来的压力也是解答这个问题的关键。

    关于中国的国内债务问题,王勇博士表示,中国意识到目前国内的杠杆水平已经达到必须采取措施化解的阶段。王炜博士回顾 2014 年
    之前,国企违约个数非常少(见下图橙色曲线);2015-2016 年随着政府撤回隐形担保,开始出现小波伏的国企违约;直到近些年国家
    政策力度加强,国企的违约数量明显上升。这证明政府确实在通过打破“国企信仰”致力于去杠杆的推进。阿尔特曼博士从学术的角度
    说明,违约数量的上升可为违约模型的建设和完善提供有用的数据和指标,而且当投资者对高风险的企业变得更加敏感并要求更高的
    风险报酬时,这正是中国市场趋于成熟发展的积极信号。


    During the Q&A, an audience member asked, “How does credit deterioration affect the credit ratings of financial institutions in interbank transactions?”
    Dr. Altman responded that unless they are faced with an undeniable credit deterioration, rating agencies are generally reluctant to downgrade their
    ratings, especially from BBB to junk bonds and that this is not what companies nor investors want to see. It is precisely because of this general resistance
    to downgrading ratings that the global financial market will face a shortage of high-risk debt financing opportunities. Dr. Altman believes that junk debt
    is not necessarily a bad thing because research shows that most countries in the world have high-risk ratings, with an average rating of B+ instead of
    BBB; once the financing plan of the company has been stranded and impeded, the financing channel can only be the bank. However, the bank holds a
    cautious attitude towards such companies (unless it is a state-owned bank guided by policies to provide them with specific support). Therefore, the
    market needs more channels to provide liquidity for high-risk credit subjects and assets. According to Dr. Altman, the influence of rating agencies needs
    to be balanced by other forces; the methods implemented in certain countries have reference value, such as Italy’s mini-bond market, a dedicated market
    for SMEs to issue bonds to the public with an issuance scale at about 2 to 30 million euros.

    “How will the repeated escalation of Sino-US tensions and European sanctions against China affect the global economy?”

    Dr. Wei Wang pointed out that Sino-US relations were already tense before COVID-19, but the pandemic has highlighted conflicts of interest in the
    global supply chain; also, as the pandemic is brought under control, clashes between China and the United States will continue to repeat themselves.
    However, returning to the basic principles of economics, each country has its own relative advantages and supply chain roles. As time goes by, trade is
    inevitable, so in the end, China and the United States should be able to reach a trade agreement that both sides can benefit from. Dr. Hotchkiss believes
    that adjustments in the global supply chain will inevitably lead to an increase in production costs, prompting upstream companies in the supply chain
    and US companies that depend on them to default and restructure. To what extent the US can withstand the pressure of increased costs is also a key to
    answering this question.
    Regarding China's domestic debt issue, Dr. Yong Wang expressed that China is aware that the current level of domestic leverage has reached a point
    where resolving measures must be taken. Dr. Wei Wang recalled that before 2014, the number of defaults by state-owned companies was very small (see
    the orange curve in the figure below). From 2015 to 2016, as the government withdrew its recessive guarantee, some state-owned companies began to
    default; it was only until the strengthening of national policies in recent years that the number of defaults by state-owned companies has increased
    significantly. This proves that the government is indeed committed to deleveraging by breaking the “faith in state-owned companies.” From an academic
    perspective,  Dr.  Altman  explained  that  the  increase  in  the  number  of  defaults  can  provide  useful  data  and  indicators  for  the  construction  and
    improvement of default models and that when investors become more sensitive to high-risk companies and demand higher risk rewards, it is a positive
    sign that the Chinese market is maturing.




























                                            CCFA JOURNAL OF FINANCE   June 2021
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