Page 30 - RD_DubaiAirshow2019

28 / Deterrent factor

service in order to consolidate their skills for
subsequent application.

Thus, it is necessary to discuss cooperation
in creating an air defence system as a whole
instead of just the purchases of arms — lack of
a systematic approach to this issue may render
any expenditures for the purchase of modern
weapons and military equipment meaningless.
Nowadays, Saudi Arabia employs American „Pa-
triot“ and „THAAD“ air defence systems, supple-
mented with „Skyguard“ small-calibre anti-air
installations of Oerlikon Contraves. The early
warning reconnaissance systems are represent-
ed by the AN/FPS-117 and AN/TPS-43 radars.
The whole system is configured around defend-
ing individual objects of critical infrastructure
and relatively small-sized areas by concentrated
defensive assets, rather than for the protection
of the whole territory of the state. The disad-
vantages of the „Patriots“ in comparison with
the S-300/S-400 systems are the longer reaction
time and the presence of a dead zone caused
by the need to preliminarily orient the inclined
launcher in the horizontal plane, which, in turn,
leads to additional time waste in the event
of a threat from an unexpected direction. The
THAAD system, though one of the most modern
means of combating short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles, is not suited to deal with
aerodynamic targets, such as UAVs and cruise
missiles, which narrows its capabilities as part
of the air/missile defence system as a whole.

The Saudi AA defence radio equipment is rep-
resented by fairly old systems developed in the
1960s and 80s, and cannot be considered mod-
ern in the current conditions, given the need to
combat low-observable low-flying targets.
Also, the USA completely lacks a middle echelon
of air/missile defence products, which is present
in the Russian proposal; their near-line assets
are limited by towed anti-aircraft artillery. These
shortcomings do not allow the realisation of
the principle of gradual defence reinforcement
in proportion to the distance to the protected
object, increasing the likelihood of a successful
attack in the event of a miss by the first-echelon
air defence assets.

The attack on the refineries in Saudi Arabia
accentuated the severity of the problem and the