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Letter from HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein to youth groups
Regarding what I was asked about concerning permission to eat and sleep outside the sukkah when taking
tiyulim during Chol Hamoed, especially trips organized by the youth groups, which is very common [in Israel],
here is the gist of my opinion, both theoretically and practically.
The basis for this issue is found in the sugya in Masechet Sukkah 26a-b: “Day travelers are exempt from the
sukkah in the day and obligated at night; night travelers are exempt from the sukkah at night and obligated
during the day. Travelers by day and night are exempt both during the day and the night.” This is cited by the
Rif and almost word for word by the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch. To the best of my knowledge there is
no posek who argues with them. The basis of this exemption is due to the principle of teishvu k’ein taduru... as
Rashi explains here: “…Just as the entire year a person doesn’t refrain from leaving, so too all the days of the chag
which are not Yom Tov, the Torah did not obligate one from refraining.” In other words, a person’s connection to
his sukkah must parallel his connection to his permanent house, but not more than that. There is no obligation
for him to suffer or be uncomfortable due to his sitting in the sukkah, more than what he would endure if he was
in his house. He is not obligated to be continually attached to his sukkah and refrain from any activities he would
do more than he would if this was his house.
Based on this, it is clear as “eggs in a dairy dish” [A Talmudic expression meaning absolutely clear] that it is
permitted for a person to plan a tiyul during sukkot even if this means that he will not fulfill the mitzvah of
sukkah for the duration of the tiyul, just as one wouldn’t refrain from taking a tiyul during the year just because
he needed to eat and sleep outside his house, or outside any house. Although Rashi mentioned travelers “for
business purposes” and his language could indicate [that the permission is] specifically for financial needs but
not for pleasure, it seems to me that there is no distinction and Rashi only mentioned this as an example, and the
Rishonim that cite this rule as halacha made no distinction. See Tosafot (s.v. holchei) who summarize Rashi’s
opinion and do not mention the reason for the travel anywhere. Even though one could argue that there is
another limitation according to their opinion, for they connected this halacha to the mitztaer, stating that both
halachot are rooted in the principle of teishvu k’ein taduru, and therefore one could argue that the exemption
of the traveler is only if by cleaving to the mitzvah of sukkah it will cause some type of suffering, but not if it
just removes one’s pleasure. However, it seems clear that they were just pointing out the common basis of the
exemption of the traveler and mitztaer, and not making one dependent on the other (see their words there).
Now the truth must be stated that the real halacha is measured not with regard to the necessity of leaving the
sukkah, but rather in its parallel between the sukkah and one’s permanent house. Accordingly, it seems that the
leniency in this case is clear.
However, there is another reason to question the position [lit. peg] that we have taken, and this is based on the
words of the Ohr Zarua regarding one who lets blood: “There are those who let blood during Chol Hamoed
and eat outside the sukkah, stating that the pain in their eyes or head hasn’t waned, but they are mistaken. For a
person who let blood is not considered a sick person, rather the opposite is true: He is happy and consumes a lot
of food and drink. Furthermore he should not have let blood during Chol Hamoed, but before or after. Such that
even regarding a mourner whose suffering comes from Heaven, we have stated previously that he has to settle
his mind to fulfill the mitzvah, how much more so in this case where he shouldn’t have let blood to begin with.”
It is evident according to his second reason that a mitzaer is not exempt from the sukkah in the event that the
suffering or the source of that suffering was under his control, and this is true even after the fact, since he did so
intentionally, unless he will endanger his life has been done, but certainly he may not do so ab initio, the Magen
Avraham has already pointed this out (640:4): “One who drinks a potion that causes him to have stomach
ailments is obligated to sit in the sukkah even though this causes him great suffering, for he should have done

118 · Hilchot Sukkah Tzurba M’Rabanan