Page 338 - Records of Bahrain (6)_Neat

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I 326 Records of Bahrain

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principle on which we and the United Statco Government
hope to oce the Persian Gulf divided, precipitates ouch
action. The State Department have suggested this formal
approach no they consider that it would have a
I considerable effect in deterring the Persian Government
in power from proceeding to raise their claim to
Bahroin and would also place on record for subsequent
Governments the inadvisability of the Persians pressing
the claim to Bahrein in face of Anglo-American opposition.
: We have been asked to give our views on this suggestion
: • and on the timing of such an approach. j
. The State Department may be correct in thinking
that the proposed communication to the Persian Govern­
; ment about off-shore oil will force the Persians to
raise finally their claim to Bahrein. This, however, is
not our view as we hope that the Persian Government will
be content with sending us a- formal note of proteot. Ill
however the Persians on being informed of our proposals
: ! in regard to off-shore oil, make it clcur that they j
intend to raise their claim to Bahrein - and the Persian
Government will obviously be under extreme pressure |
from Tudeh deputies ouch as Iskandari, to do so - then a
formal approach on the lines suggested to the State
Ill Department, apart from giving substance to the claim )
of opponents of the Persian Government that v/e and the
, i United States have determined to carve up the Gulf ;
regardless of Persian interests and have come to a j
secret agreement to divide the oil resources of the
Middle East, might force the Persian Government to look
! to Russiun support to placate a public outcry against
acceding to the Anglo-American approach. Instoad of,
therefore, deterring the Persian Government from raising
5 their claim to Bahrein, h formal parallel approach from
both Governments might determine the Persian Government
I
: . to take their claim to the United Rations.
It might therefore be preferable if the United I
I States Government could make their position clear in an
oral communication at the time when both Governments
I: approach the Persians about off-shore oil. This would
strengthen our request that the Persiuns ohould not go
beyond a formal note of protest and would give nottre .
to the Persian Government that if they proceeded to
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raise their claim they could not expect any support
from the United States Government at the United Rations.
I i Such an upproach would not receive undue publicity and
if the Persian Government still insisted upon proceeding
> with their claim they would be very likely to agree to
a suggestion that the dispute should bo referred to the
International Court. This would be in keeping with
Tehran'8 views on E 11994 and would remove the dispute
from the political to the legal sphere. We also could
: hope in'this way to secure all the benefits of American
support without the disadvantage of seeming to give the
Persians a Joint ultimatum.
.
(R. A. Clinton-Thomao)*-
29th September, 1946.