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                                                             15.2 EVALUATING RISKY OUTCOMES                     615
                      expected values and is therefore indifferent between a sure thing and a lottery with the
                      same expected value. To see why, note that a risk-neutral decision maker has a linear
                      utility function, U   a   bI, where a is a nonnegative constant and b is a positive con-
                                                           2
                      stant. Consider a lottery with payoffs I 1  and I and associated probabilities p and 1   p.
                      The expected utility EU of the lottery is
                                           EU   p(a   bI )   (1   p)(a   bI )
                                                       1
                                                                        2
                                                 a   b[pI   (1   p)I ]
                                                       1
                                                                  2
                      The term in the square brackets is the expected value EV of the lottery, so EU   a   bEV.
                      Thus, when the expected value equals the payoff of the sure thing (i.e., when EV   I),
                      the expected utility equals the utility of the sure thing (i.e., EU   U).
                         Returning to our job offer example, we see that if you were risk neutral, you
                      would be indifferent between the sure $54,000 salary you would receive from the es-
                      tablished company and the expected salary of $54,000 associated with the offer from
                      the start-up company. Figure 15.6 shows the utility function of a risk-neutral indi-
                      vidual. Since the utility function is a straight line, the marginal utility of income is
                      constant—that is, the change in utility from any given increment to income is the
                      same, no matter what the decision maker’s income level.
                         When a decision maker is risk loving, he or she prefers a lottery to a sure thing  risk loving  A character-
                      that is equal to the expected value of the lottery. In the job offer example, your   istic of a decision maker
                      expected utility from accepting the offer from the start-up company would exceed the  who prefers a lottery to a
                      utility that you get from accepting the offer from the established company. As shown  sure thing that is equal to
                      in Figure 15.7, a risk-loving decision maker has a utility function that exhibits increas-  the expected value of the
                                                                                                lottery.
                      ing marginal utility—that is, the change in utility from any given increment to income
                      goes up as the decision maker’s income goes up.










                                                            Utility function
                            T
                            S





                          Utility


                                                                               FIGURE 15.6    Utility Function for a Risk-
                                                                               Neutral Decision Maker
                                                                               The utility function is a straight line, so
                                                                               marginal utility is constant. The change in
                            R
                           Q                                                   utility from any given increment to income is
                                                                               the same, no matter what the decision maker’s
                             0 4                                   104         income level (e.g., the distance from point
                                       Income (thousands of dollars per year)  Q to point R is the same as the distance from
                                                                               point S to point T).
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